The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly, and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature's choice.
Introduction
Consider a repeated stage game in which the sets of players and actions are known, but the distribution of payoffs conditional on action profiles is chosen randomly once and for all at the start of play, and the players do not observe nature's choice. The players have a common prior over the finite set of possible states of the world, and they have two ways of (directly) learning the state over time. First, each player observes the profile of actions and his own realized payoff in each period -that payoff is random variable whose distribution depends on the state. Second, every period there is a noisy public signal of the state. The public signal varies in informativeness across action profiles, and stochastically incorporates the information in the privately-observed payoffs. A player may also learn about the state indirectly, if the actions of other players reveal their history of private payoffs. This paper, extending the result of Wiseman (2005) , establishes for such games a partial folk theorem of the following sort: for any function mapping each state of the world to a payoff vector that is feasible and individually rational in that state, there exists a sequential equilibrium in which patient players achieve the payoff specified for whatever state is realized. (That folk theorem is "partial" because there may be equilibria without learning that yield ex ante -that is, unconditional on the state -expected payoffs outside the set derived here.) That result also holds in the case where there is no public signal, but players receive very closely correlated private signals of the vector of realized payoffs in each period (if there are at least three players and cheap talk is allowed).
One example of such a game is the situation of oligopolists introducing a product into a new market with uncertain demand. Every month, each seller sets a publiclyobserved price, and sees her own sales and a noisy public indicator of total sales in the market. 1 Another situation fitting the model is co-authors presenting a joint research paper. Each author sees which seminars and conferences the other is invited to, but does not observe the reaction of the audience. Opposing sides of a war-of-attrition-type strike,
with asymmetric information about the costs of holding out, may read newspaper accounts of how their opponents are faring. The model also applies to wars between nations, or to partners in a joint investment project who observe their own returns precisely and each others' returns only approximately.
These repeated games with unknown payoff distributions and private learning are in some ways analogous to repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In the latter class of games, focusing on perfect public equilibria (PPEs), in which players' strategies depend only on public information, has been a fruitful approach to obtaining folk theorems (as in Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) ). The key insight in establishing the existence of a PPE in their setting is that the set of best responses to a public strategy profile always includes a public strategy: when the other players' future actions depend only on public information, a player loses nothing by ignoring his private information. In the current context, however, a perfect public equilibrium may fail to exist; there may be no public strategy best response to a public strategy profile, for two reasons. First, a player's private information influences his expectation of future public signals and thus his expectations of the future play of his opponents. Second, the public history may call for him to play a sequence of actions that he knows from his private signals will yield a payoff below his minmax payoff. For both reasons, it may be costly for a player to ignore his private information, and so any best response must be a private strategy.
More generally, the potential for private and public beliefs to diverge creates a difficulty in deriving a folk theorem of the type desired when players learn privately.
(Such a divergence of beliefs is, almost by definition, unlikely, but depending on the signal structure it may occur with positive probability in equilibrium.) For example, suppose that the public signals that the players use to determine their actions in equilibrium suggest very strongly that nature has chosen State A, but Player 1's private payoffs indicate State B even more strongly, so that his private belief assigns probability close to one to State B. In that situation, Player 1 believes that eventually the public belief will converge to State B if players continue to experiment, but i) in the future, equilibrium may specify only actions that yield the same payoffs in all states, so that no further learning occurs, or ii) the current public belief may put so little weight on State B that the expected time before convergence is very long, even if the equilibrium calls for continued experimentation. Further, in State B the equilibrium actions specified for State A may yield a lower payoff to Player 1 than the actions designed to punish Player 1 for a deviation in State A yield, and so Player 1 will deviate. In response, however, the other players may conclude that Player 1 must have believed in State B, and so the public belief may adjust very far toward State B. But then such a deviation may be profitable for Player 1 even when his private information is consistent with State A, if the punishment profile specified for him in State B gives him a higher payoff when the actual state is A than does the on-path profile specified in State A.
In this paper, the way around such complications is to construct equilibrium block strategies, in which actions depend only on recent public signals. For example, if the blocks are 100 periods long, then the actions in period 199 are determined by the public signals from periods 101 through 198 only. In effect, the players coordinate their actions using a public "dummy belief" over states, which is reset to the prior at the beginning of each block. This approach bounds the possible divergence between private beliefs and the dummy belief. In particular, a patient player prefers not to deviate even if the dummy belief, after a sequence of misleading public signals, calls for an action profile that he believes will give him a very low payoff for the duration of the current block -at the start of the next block, the dummy belief reverts to the prior, and with high likelihood experimentation in the next block (and all future blocks) will reveal the true state and enable the other players either to give him his equilibrium payoff or to effectively punish his deviation. The strategies constructed are public on the equilibrium path, but after deviating a player uses a private strategy temporarily, as will be described in detail later.
For that reason, the strategies are neither a "belief-free" equilibrium, as in Hörner and Lovo (2009) and Hörner, Lovo, and Tomala (forthcoming) , for example, nor a "perfect public ex-post" equilibrium, as in Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010) .
An additional difficulty in that construction is that a player being minmaxed may Instead, CEMS study conditions under which the information in these private signals will eventually generate "common learning" -that is, the realized state ω becomes common 1-belief (each player believes with probability one that each player believes with probability one … that the state is ω) in the limit. One goal of that research is to establish conditions for a folk theorem. The relationship between their work and this paper is discussed briefly in the conclusion.
The literature on repeated games with incomplete information is extensive; see Aumann and Hart (1992) and Aumann and Maschler (1996) . Lehrer (1993, 1995) examine the case where players are uncertain both about payoffs and about the strategies of other players. Nearer to this paper, Gossner and Vieille (2003) and Wiseman (2005) establish folk theorems (without discounting and with discounting, respectively) for repeated games with symmetric learning. The most closely-related papers are Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010) and Yamamoto (2010) On the other hand, the models in Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010) and Yamamoto (2010) allow not only imperfect monitoring, but uncertainty about the monitoring structure itself, which are substantial extensions relative to the perfect monitoring of actions assumed in this paper. Another difference is that the proof here is constructive, while Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010) and Yamamoto (2010) use an extension of the linear programming techniques of .
Another strand of related literature is on reputation games with two patient players; the difference in those models is that the uninformed player gets no signals of the informed player's type except through the actions of the informed player. Mailath and Samuelson (2006) provide an extensive summary of research in that area; more recent work includes Pęski (2008) and Atakan and Ekmekci (2009a , 2009b , 2009c . Similarly, Hörner and Lovo (2009) The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 contains the folk theorem and its proof, Section 4 extends the result to the case of private, almost-public signals, and Section 5 concludes.
Model
There is a set Ω of K possible states of the world and N > 1 expected-utility maximizing players repeating a stage game infinitely. The players have a common discount factor δ. Before the start of play, the state of the world ω is chosen once and for all according the commonly-known distribution Φ, which assigns strictly positive probability to each of the K possible states. In each different state ω, the stage game G(ω) has different payoffs but the same set of action profiles Define u as the highest absolute value of expected stage-game payoffs across all players, all action profiles, and all states of the world, so that
Define U u > as ‫ݑܰ√‬ ത; no vector of expected payoffs can have a length greater than U .
For each player i and state ω, let m
be the action profile that minmaxes player i in state ω, and let e i (ω) denote the corresponding minmax payoff.
That is,
Let V(ω), defined as the convex hull of the set {EU(a, ω) ∈ R N : a ∈ A}, be the set of feasible payoffs in state ω. Then V*(ω) ≡ {u ∈ V(ω) : u i > e i (ω) for all i ∈ N} is the set of strictly-individually-rational feasible payoffs. Extending the standard fulldimensionality condition for folk theorems to the case of multiple states, I assume that
Results
The main result is that for any function mapping each state of the world to a payoff vector that is feasible and strictly individually rational in that state, there exists a sequential equilibrium in which (with very high probability) players achieve (very close to) the payoff specified for the realized state, as long as players are patient enough.
Proposition 1. Let ε > 0 and payoffs
given, and let Φ be a prior belief that assigns strictly positive probability to each state. If
Assumption 1 holds, then there exists δ < 1 such that for all δ > δ, there is a sequential equilibrium that with probability at least 1 − ε, conditional on any state ω being realized, The proof is constructive, using elements of Fudenberg and Maskin's (1986) and Gossner and Vieille's (2003) In a minmax block, the challenge is that the punished player i may be able to block experimentation, making it impossible for the other players to identify the state and play the appropriate minmax profile. For example, player i may have an action a i such that any profile that includes a i yields a payoff independent of the state. The resulting lack of learning is a problem, since a profile that minmaxes player i in one state may give him a high payoff in another. It turns out, though, that there is a strategy for the other players that prevents player i from simultaneously getting a high payoff and blocking learning. Suppose that the other players play m i (ω), the profile that minmaxes player i in state ω. If player i's response yields him a payoff above (in expectation) his state-ω minmax e i (ω), then necessarily his payoff reveals that the state is not ω. The public signal, by Assumption 1, reveals that information as well, and so the other players will learn. The other players, then, can start a minmax-i block by playing the minmax profile m i (ω′ ) corresponding to the state ω in which the minmax payoff e i (ω′ ) is lowest;
continue playing that profile unless they learn that the state is not ω′ ; then switch to the minmax profile for the state with the second-lowest minmax payoff; and so on. If they follow such a strategy, then, conditional on any state ω being realized, the number of periods in the block in which player i can attain a payoff above his minmax payoff for that state e i (ω) is bounded (probabilistically). Thus, if the number of periods in the minmax block is high enough, then player i's average payoff in the block cannot be (much) greater than e i (ω).
During a minmax-i block, deviations by player i are ignored. Therefore, the optimal strategy for player i is to play a best response to the equilibrium actions of the other players for the remaining periods of the minmax-i block. Note that as a consequence the equilibrium strategies are not public strategies. The actions chosen by a player who has not deviated depend only on the public history, but the actions of a player who has deviated will in general depend (during the subsequent minmax block) on his private beliefs.
Proof of Proposition 1:
For each state ω ∈ Ω and each player i, choose a payoff vector
i; these feasible, strictly individually rational payoffs will be the long-run (that is, after the minmax block) payoffs after a deviation by player i. Without loss of generality,
for all players and states.
Choose a positive integer M to satisfy the following three conditions: ω′, updating the prior Φ with the resulting public signals yields a posterior probability that puts weight less than 2 ε on ω with probability at least
The second condition requires that M periods of experimentation, split equally among all action profiles, are with high probability sufficient to learn the state with great precision, starting from the prior. The third condition says that if the other players play the state-ω minmax profile for player i when the actual state is ω′, and player i's response yields an expected (in state ω′ ) payoff above his state-ω minmax, then within M/K periods the players will very likely learn very precisely that the state is not ω.
Thus, if action profile a is played for M periods and action profile a′ for T periods in state ω, then the average payoff (without discounting) in those M + T periods will be Finally, the value of the discount factor δ will be described later.
The equilibrium strategies are based on 2N + 1 types of blocks, as described above. There are an on-equilibrium block, a post-deviation block for each player, and a minmax block for each player.
Within-block strategies:
The on-equilibrium block has length M + T periods. Order the action profiles A arbitrarily, as (That is, the other players do not interpret any action by player i as a deviation.) Among the other players, simultaneous deviations are ignored. If any player j ≠ i deviates unilaterally, then the minmax-i block ends immediately, and a minmax-j block begins in the next period (as described below).
Transitions between blocks:
Play begins with an on-equilibrium block. An on-equilibrium block in which there are no unilateral deviations is followed by another on-equilibrium block, and a postdeviation-i block with no unilateral deviations is followed by another post-deviation-i block. A minmax-i block with no unilateral deviations (by a player other than player i) is followed by a post-deviation-i block.
During an equilibrium block or post-deviation-i block, if player j (possibly j = i)
deviates unilaterally, then a transition to a minmax-j block occurs in the next period.
Finally, in the case of a deviation during a minmax-i block by a player j other than player i, a transition to a minmax-j block occurs in the next period.
Beliefs:
On the equilibrium path, each player's private belief
( ) t t i i b h is derived by
Bayesian updating of the prior Φ using the information in his private history t i h . Actions, because they depend only on the public signals, reveal nothing about players' private payoffs. Off equilibrium, a player's decision to deviate is also treated as uninformative.
After player i deviates, his actions in the subsequent minmax-i block may depend on his history of private payoffs, and so the other players' private beliefs incorporate that information. (Note that during that time player i has no incentive to deviate from a shortrun best response in order to influence others' beliefs, since their actions depend only on the public history. On the other hand, his choice of a short-run best response reflects any expected benefit from influencing the flow of public signals.)
Payoffs:
Condition 2 implies that with probability at least 
Best-response conditions:
The value of the discount factor δ can be chosen so that no player has an incentive to deviate, on or off the equilibrium path, whatever his private belief about the state or his higher order beliefs (about others' beliefs), and whatever the truncated dummy belief. In a minmax-i block, player i has no incentive to deviate: he is playing a short-run best response within the block, and his actions do not affect play after the block. On the equilibrium path, there is no profitable deviation if condition 6 and the following condition hold: That is, even if deviating results in the highest possible immediate payoff, and not deviating results in the lowest for the rest of the block, the overall payoff from deviating is lower, no matter how many periods of the block remain. Condition 5 guarantees that condition 8 is satisfied for high δ.
Finally, note that since for high δ the expected payoff from an on-equilibrium block, conditional on any state ω being realized, is within 2 ε of v*(ω), so is the expected equilibrium payoff of the repeated game. Since both payoff realizations and public signals are i.i.d. across periods (conditional on the state and actions), a central limit theorem implies that the undiscounted average of the discounted block payoffs (that is,
converges over time to a normally distributed random variable with a mean that is also within 2 ε of v*(ω); the variance shrinks to zero. Thus, if δ is high enough, then the limiting discounted average of the block payoffs (which is the realized payoff of the repeated game) is with probability at least 1 − ε within ε of v*(ω). (Call that lower bound of the value of δ condition 9.)
If the discount factor δ is high enough to satisfy conditions 6-9, then the strategies and beliefs constructed constitute a sequential equilibrium in which with high probability the players achieve payoffs close to those specified for the realized state. Since players experiment at the beginning of each on-equilibrium block, their private beliefs converge to the truth with probability 1.
Q.E.D.
In the model of Section 2, players get (direct) information about the state of the world only from the public signals and from their own realized payoffs. In many settings, though, players might learn about the state in other ways, during the game or before play starts -some of the examples discussed in the introduction fit that assumption. In such an environment, the strategies constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 are still an equilibrium; the key is that each player, no matter the gap between his private belief and the public signals in the current block, expects that the public signals from experimentation in future blocks will identify the true state with high probability. Proposition 2 states that result formally:
Proposition 2. Suppose that in any realized state ω, each player i in each period t ∈ {0, 1, … } observes a private signal drawn from a distribution F it (ω). Let ε > 0 and payoffs
be given, and let Φ be a prior belief that assigns strictly positive probability to each state. If Assumption 1 holds, then there exists δ < 1 such that for all δ > δ, there is a sequential equilibrium that with probability at least 1 − ε, conditional on state ω, yields a payoff vector within ε of v*(ω). In equilibrium,
each player i's private belief converges to the truth: lim ( )[ ] 1 t t i i t b h ω →∞
= with probability 1.
Private, Almost-Public Signals
In this section Proposition 1 is extended to the case where there may be no public F . These signals are cheap talk: they will be used to communicate private signals, but players are free to announce any signal that they wish. (These cheap-talk signals will also be used to let a player specify the action profile that he wants to be played during his "reward period," as described in the proof of Proposition 3.) Player i's private history (Note that in the special case described above, η-public signals must also be η-perfect: player i observes his own payoff U i , so player j's signal of U i can match player i's only if it is exactly correct.)
Proposition 1 extends to this environment when the private signals are almost public. Proposition 3 gives the formal statement:
Proposition 3. Suppose that N ≥ 3. Let ε > 0 and payoffs v*(ω 1 ) ∈ int(V*(ω 1 )), … , v*(ω K ) ∈ int(V*(ω K )) be given, and let Φ be a prior belief that assigns strictly positive probability to each state. If Assumption 1 holds, then there exists δ < 1 and ߟҧ > 0 such that if δ > δ and signals are ߟҧ -public, there is a sequential equilibrium that with probability at least 1 − ε, conditional on any state ω being realized, yields a payoff vector within ε of v*(ω). In equilibrium, each player i's private belief converges to the truth:
The strategies used to proof Proposition 3 are very similar to those in the proof of Proposition 1, with public, cheap-talk announcements of private signals taking the place of public signals as a coordinating device. The additional difficulty is to provide incentives for honest reporting. The solution to that difficulty is to punish when players' reports do not agree. Thus, a player wants to announce whatever he believes that other players will announce, and when signals are almost public, he believes that other players saw (and will announce) the same signals that he observed. The close correlation of players' signals is important in this argument. Without it, a player who assigns high probability to state 1 but sees a signal that is very unlikely in that state may believe that other players probably did not see the same signal. As long as there are at least three players reporting their signals, it is possible to identify (and punish) any single player who makes an announcement that differs from all the others. 
Within-block strategies:
Just as before, the on-equilibrium block and the post-deviation-i blocks have length M + T periods, and the minmax-i blocks last for M + T′ periods (except as described below). At the end of each period (with one exception, also described below), players announce their private signals truthfully. If at least N -1 players announce the same signal y in period t, then the dummy public signal for period t, ˆt z , is equal to y;
otherwise, a multilateral misreport has occurred. (In that case, no dummy public signal is generated, as described below.) A period-s-truncated dummy public history private signals truthfully, there will potentially be a single "reward period" added to the end of the block. In each period of the block that all players announce the same signal, the probability that such a reward period will be played increases (from an initial value of zero) by
(The total probability is bounded above by 1, since M + T′ is the length of the block.) At the end of the block, public randomization determines whether or not the reward period will be played, and player i announces the action profile α R to be played in the reward period; α R is the profile that maximizes player i's expected payoff in the stage game, given his private belief. If the reward period is to occur, then α R is played. Players do not make an announcement at the end of a reward period.
Transitions between blocks:
Transitions are just as in the public-signal case, with two differences: unilateral misreports are treated like deviations, and after a multilateral misreport the next block starts immediately. Play begins with an on-equilibrium block. An on-equilibrium block in which there are no unilateral violations is followed by another on-equilibrium block, and a post-deviation-i block with no unilateral violations is followed by another postdeviation-i block. A minmax-i block with no unilateral deviations or unilateral misreports (by a player other than player i) is followed by a post-deviation-i block.
Those transitions occur immediately if a multilateral misreport occurs; otherwise they occur after the end of the current block.
During an equilibrium block or post-deviation-i block, if player j (possibly j = i) commits a unilateral violation, then a transition to a minmax-j block occurs in the next period. 6 Finally, in the case of a unilateral violation during a minmax-i block by a player j other than player i, a transition to a minmax-j block occurs in the next period.
Beliefs:
( ) t t i i b h is derived by
Bayesian updating of the prior Φ using the information in his private history 
Payoffs and Best-Response Conditions:
If the probability that players receive different private signals is zero (η = 0), then the arguments of the public-signal case ensure that the actions specified above are best responses, that with high probability the players achieve payoffs close to those specified for the realized state, and that private beliefs converge to the truth with probability 1. For small enough values of η, the expected (conditional on state ω) discounted average payoff of an on-equilibrium block, a post-deviation-i block, and a minmax-i block are
, and e i (ω), respectively, when δ is high, so the same arguments apply. (The behavior of a player i during a minmax-i block may change when η is slightly positive rather than 0, because he may have been playing only a weak best response, but in all other cases the best-response conditions were satisfied with strict inequalities.) All that remains is to show that truthfully reporting private signals is a best response.
During an on-equilibrium block, for example, a player's announcement can influence future play in three ways. First, it affects whether a transition to the next block occurs immediately (as it does after a misreport) or not. Second, it affects the type of future blocks, by influencing whether or not a misreport occurs, and which kind. Third, if another player unilaterally commits a violation in the future, then afterward his play in the short run depends on his private beliefs and thus on past announcements. With regard to the first effect, the greatest possible (undiscounted, expected) gain from a false report the maximum difference between two payoffs in the stage game times the number of periods in the block, 2ܷ ഥ ሺ‫ܯ‬ ܶሻ. The cost from the second effect is that unless one of the other players received a signal different from his own (an event that occurs with probability no greater than η), player i's false report will result in a unilateral misreport and the resulting punishment: a lower continuation payoff. The third effect has a negligible effect on expected payoffs for small values of η, because misreports become very rare, and unilateral deviations are off-path (for any η) starting from any history.
Thus, when η is low enough, conditions 6 and 7, which ensure that player i has no incentive to deviate from his prescribed action during an on-equilibrium block, also guarantee that truthfully reporting private signals is optimal. Similarly, conditions 6 and 7 also deter false reporting by player i during post-deviation-j blocks and minmax-j blocks, and conditions 6 and 8 suffice during post-deviation-i blocks.
During a minmax-i block, unilateral misreports by player i do not affect the type of future blocks, so future punishment cannot deter false reporting by player i. Instead, the reward period gives player i the incentive to report truthfully. The continuation payoff from future blocks when η is small is close to report can generate either a unilateral misreport by player j (so that future punishment is transferred to player j), or a multilateral misreport that ends the current block early.
However, the event that some other player receives a different signal occurs with probability no greater than η. Thus, for δ and small enough η, truthful reporting is optimal.
Thus, when N ≥ 3 and signals are η-public for low enough η, then the strategies and beliefs constructed constitute a sequential equilibrium in which with high probability the players achieve payoffs close to those specified for the realized state, and private beliefs converge to the truth with probability 1.
Q.E.D.
As was the case with public signals, the strategies constructed above still constitute an equilibrium if players receive additional private signals about the state of the world before or during play:
Proposition 4. Suppose that N ≥ 3, and suppose that in any realized state ω, each player i in each period t ∈ {0, 1, … } observes a private signal drawn from a distribution F it (ω).
Let ε > 0 and payoffs v*(ω 1 ) ∈ int(V*(ω 1 )), … , v*(ω K ) ∈ int(V*(ω K )) be given, and let Φ be a prior belief that assigns strictly positive probability to each state. If Assumption 1 holds, then there exists δ < 1 and ߟҧ > 0 such that if δ > δ and signals are ߟҧ -public, there is a sequential equilibrium that with probability at least 1 − ε, conditional on state ω, 
Summary and Discussion
This paper presents a form of folk theorem for repeated games with unknown payoffs when player receive both private and public signals. The environment is a generalization of the one in Wiseman (2005) , and Proposition 1 is a stronger result than Theorem 1 in Wiseman (2005) . (The result in the earlier paper establishes only that expected equilibrium payoffs are close to the targets, while Proposition 1 ensures that with high probability the realized payoffs are close.) Thus, this paper provides an alternative proof of Theorem 1 in Wiseman (2005) .
The strategies described in Sections 2 and 3 rely on the assumption that the mixed actions used by players are observable only in the construction of the minmax blocks. If instead only the actions played are observed, then the folk theorems continue to hold for payoffs above the pure-strategy minmax payoffs, rather than the mixed-strategy minmax payoffs e i (ω). Alternatively, it seems feasible to restore the result for the mixed-strategy minmax case using the arguments of Maskin's (1986) Section 6 and Gossner (1995) , although the extension is not immediate.
As mentioned in the introduction, CEMS study common learning. In order to focus on that topic, they strip away from their environment strategic considerations, as well as the ability for a player to learn other players' private signals through their actions and the ability of a player to try to manipulate that learning. Those complications do arise in this paper. The endogeneity of the private signals (they depend on actions) is another challenge. The availability of repeated-game punishments and incentives, however, greatly simplifies the task of identifying sufficient conditions for a folk theorem, relative to CEMS's environment. On the other hand, Proposition 1 says nothing about whether or not common learning occurs in the equilibrium construction, or, more generally, about whether or not common learning is a necessary or sufficient condition for this kind of folk theorem.
It seems likely that the folk theorem in this paper (or some version of it) can be extended to settings where the state of the world changes over time, or where the public signals are less revealing.
A dynamic state might evolve according to a Markov process, with players possibly unable to observe when a transition takes place. More generally, the transition and its observability might depend on the players' actions. Given the "repeated sampling" feature of the equilibrium constructed in this paper, it should be straightforward to modify that equilibrium to apply to the case of dynamic states. One complication is the relationship between the frequency at which the state changes to the speed at which players can learn the state through public signals -if the former is too high relative to the latter, then the folk theorem may fail. (Dutta (1995) , Fudenberg and Yamamoto (forthcoming-a), and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (forthcoming) derive folk theorems for classes of such stochastic games for the case where state transitions are publicly observed.) Finally, it would be interesting to weaken the assumption that the public signal contains at least as much information (statistically) as all of the private payoffs taken collectively. It may be the case, then, that there are two distinct states of the world in which the distribution of the public signal is the same for a given action profile, even though one or more players get different payoffs from that profile in the different states.
Without the assumption, however, the construction of the minmax blocks fails. Player i may get a high payoff in response to the state-ω 1 minmax profile without the other players' ever realizing it. Roughly, it may be that player i learns the state, but the other players do not, an outcome that clearly limits the scope of punishment (and thus of the payoffs achievable in equilibrium). In order to take advantage of that asymmetry in information, however, player i must not reveal the state through his actions. His best response to the other players' punishment strategy, though, may vary with the state; there is thus a tension between the desire to use his private information and the desire to conceal it. Consider the following two-state, two-player example, in which player 1 can distinguish between states and player 2 cannot. Figure 1 In state 2, R is the minmax profile and 2 is the minmax payoff. If player 2 is uncertain about the state and tries to punish player 1 using the strategy from the minmax block constructed in the previous section, then he begins by playing L, the minmax profile in state 1 (the state with the lower minmax payoff). Player 1's best response to L is T in both states, however, so her action will not reveal the state. Thus, in state 2 this strategy
give player 1 a payoff of 3, which is not an effective punishment. Suppose, however, that instead player 2 punishes by beginning with action R. Player 1's best response depends on the state: it is T in state 1 and B in state 2. If he responds by playing T in both states, then in state 2 he gets 0, which is below his minmax. If he responds with B in both states, then in state 1 he gets 0, which is below his minmax. In order to best respond, then, he must condition his action on the state, thus revealing the state to player 2 and enabling her to punish effectively.
Similar situations arise in the study of repeated two-player zero-sum games with incomplete information on one side. The analysis of, for example, Aumann and Maschler (1995) (in particular, the notion of Blackwell, 1956, approachability) can be applied to
